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Synopsis
1. Posterior Analytics 1.3 is often taken to be the core of an argument for a 
foundationalist epistemology. But on such an understanding/ Aristotle's position 
leaves us disappointed/ for he never explains clearly how we come to know the 
foundational first principles in the absolutely secure way which foundationalism 
requires. Instead, his answer (in An. Post. 11.19) is mystifying.
2. Some have responded by trying to find evidence elsewhere for the needed 
absolute security. Kahn finds it in the Unmoved Mover and proclaims Aristotle a 
'super-rationalist.' Nussbaum builds on Owen's observation that the 'phenomena' 
which inquiry must take account of include established opinions to conclude that 
with respect to the principles, Aristotle is a sort of Putnamian. internal realist.
3. There are also problems about the relationship between this foundationalist 
and apriorist epistemology evidently espoused in the Analytics and the actual 
practice of the treatises, which pften emphasize the importance of thorough 
observation, normally begin with a survey of the views of predecessors, and never 
appeal to any sort of self-evidence. This has sometimes been taken as an indica“ 
tion that the scientific treatises are working studies rather than fully articu­
lated theories (Barnes,). :
4.,;, Irwin has built a comprehensive interprétât ion of Aristotle's philosophy in 
order to resolve these issues. Very briefly summarized, his position is that the 
Posterior Analytics does indeed put forward a foundationalist epistemology in 
which all justifications rest ultimately on indemonstrable first principles.
These first principles, in turn, are certified as true and secure by the somewhat 
mysterious agency of νους (thus, Irwin's reading of 11.19 is substantially tradi­
tional). However, Irwin holds not only that this is an intrinsicaily unsatisfac­
tory account of -knowledge, but also that Aristotle himself eventually came to séë 
it as inadequate: in later treatises, Aristotle revised his view of the role of 
dialectic in reaching the first, principles and came to believe that first princi­
ples could be established (roughly as Kantian-like background principles) by ' 
beginning with 'common beliefs' and refining and correcting them through proce­
dures ■ resembling those of dialectic (Irwin refers to this procedure, which he 
takes to be Aristotle's mature conception of the method of philosophy, 'strong 
dialectic').
5. But another approach to the Postërior Analytics, one which altogether 
eliminates these problems, was put.forward over à décade ago’by Burnyeat. He 
proposes that Aristotle mingles together issues that we assign to epistemology 
with issues that we assign to the philosophy of science. The result is that much 
of what is .often taken for epistemological argument, concerned with justification, 
actually is about scierrtific/explanation./ This holds in particular for the 
central theory of demonstration in the Posterior Analytics: έπιστήιιη has rather more 
in common, with scientific understanding than with knowledge in general.
6. Burnyeat's position does.much to clarify what seems to be missing from·thè 
Posterior Analytics. If the positions debated in 1.3 are not alternative views'6f 
justification but alternative views of explanation, then Aristotle is not arguing 
for foundationalism, against coherentism and skepticism, but for the very, differ­
ent thesis that not everything can be explained. In that case, hë will not be/ 
primarily concerned to show that we have an absolutely secure cognition of the " 
first principles (as foundationalism requires of the' ultimate justifying bëliéfs) 
but will instead need to show, how they can be explanatory primitives. Burnyeat 
argues that.in fact Aristotle is not much concerned about justification and its 
companion, certainty; instead, the question he asks is 'How is it possible fôr us 
to acquire understanding?' Aristotle's general picture is that we understand when
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we have made those principles which ape objectively first (in the sense that they 
truly explain the way things are) also subjectively first (in the sense that they 
seem most convincing or evident to us): our goal is to make what is γνωριμώτερον τή 
φύσει become also γνωριμώτερον ήμιν. This requires practice and habituation, just as, 
in the moral sphere, it takes practice and habituation to make what is genuinely 
good (and thus 'pleasant in itself') seem pleasant to us (when we have acquired 
mpral virtue). Thus, Burnyeat is able to explain why An. Post. 11.19 seems at 
onçe to embrace an empiricist view (we come to know the principles through 
induction) and a rationalist one (we know the principles through νους, which 
develops in us by nature). The answer is that Aristotle is not trying to explain 
how we can avoid error but instead to explain what we must be like if we are to 
bring about in ourselves that state of understanding of the first principles 
required for scientific explanations.
7. Now, if Burnyeat is right that in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle is not 
really doing epistemology, not really concerned with justification and certainty, 
then Irwin's project loses its point, Irwin recognizes the difficulty, but he 
does not think that Burnyeat's arguments are sufficient to establish this point.
In particular, he does not think Burnyeat has established that An. Post. 1.3 is 
about scientific explanation rather than justification, because: (1) Aristotle 
takes the types of demonstration discussed in 1.3 to violate 'general conditions 
for knowledge,' not merely constraints on demonstration; (2) Aristotle's language 
often uses general epistemic terms (είδέν<*ι, γνωριμώτερον, αγνώστους) rather than terms 
derived from έπίστασθαι; (3) the various possibilities considered are 'three ways of 
answering a question about justification'; (4) even if it is explanations and not 
justifications that Aristotle is concerned with, 'he will have to appeal to those 
very claims about priority and independençe in knowledge that support claims about 
justification.' (All quotes from Irwin 1988. 530.)
8. Now, point (2) is effective only if we can be certain that Aristotle is not 
using these more general terms as stand-ins for επιστήμη. But it is more likely 
that Aristotle regards επιστήμη not sq much as one species of knowledge alongside 
others, but instead as what knowledge in its most representative stated-knowledge 
κυρίως, to use his idiom. If that is the case, then he might occasionally use more 
generic epistemic terms simply because, in talking about what is most properly 
knowledge, he is talking about what knowledge really is.
9. Point (1) could best be expanded as the claim that the constraints violated 
by infinite regresses of premises, regresses which terminate in unknown first 
premises, and circular demonstrations are all constraints which are most intelli­
gible if taken to apply to knowledge generally. But this is answered if there is 
another equally, or more, plausible way to read them. In fact, there is: the 
response to this point is inseparable to the response to (4) (see below, sect.
11).
10. Point (3)-'■’■if I am fair in treating this as a separate point--is evidently 
that there is a close parallel between the contents of An. Post. 1,3 and much 
argument typical of contemporary epistemology. I concede that the parallels are 
striking, and in fact I note shortly below some further parallels of my own. 
However, there is a crucial dissimilarity which, in my opinion, shows precisely 
that justification is not what is important for Aristotle.
11. Point (4) amounts to the claim that an account, of explanation must ultimate­
ly depend on an account of justification. This response is in fact the most 
critical. An explanation can be an explanation only if it is true; therefore, any 
adequate theory of explanation must rest on an underlying theory of justification 
or otherwise be vulnerable to skeptical objections. But while this point may be 
epistemologically correct, it does not follow that Aristotle appreciated it or 
that he had a response to it. Modern (i.e. post-1637) epistemology, like any 
other area of theoretical inquiry, takes its origins in certain problems which it 
tries to solve. Aristotle's advice in Met. B is appropriate: before we can
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understand or appreciate the solutions which it offers, we need to understand just 
what these problems are.
12. To a very great extent, the arguments which drive modern epistemology are 
what I call subjective-illusion arguments. Such an argument resolves around a 
hypothetical case in which: (1) a subject S believes a proposition p (which may 
even be true), but (2) there is some alternative situation such that, (2a) were S 
in that other situation, S would not be able to discern it from the situation S is 
actually in, and (2b) in that other situation p would be false. Arguments of this 
type dominate epistemology from Descartes's Meditations to Gettier problems, twin- 
earth cases, and brains in vats. The point about subjective-illusion cases is 
that they depict, prima facie, cases in which a subject might have a false belief 
but not be able to tell it. We do not like such cases, especially when they can 
be constructed so as to apply to our own experience: they seem to imply that we do 
not know what we think we know. Thus, epistemology arises as the response to 
these threats to our conception that we do have a certain amount of knowledge.
13. Of course, there are a variety of responses to these threats: one may argue 
that they can be met, one may give in and become a skeptic, or one may try to 
argue that somehow the threats are not real. However, a common thread running 
through much epistemological argument is the concept of justification. A justifi­
cation, from this perspective, is a remedy against the threat of an undetected 
illusion: if one of my beliefs is justified, then I may stop worrying about 
whether or not it is true. This suggests that justification is really of merely 
instrumental value, as a means to having true beliefs and avoiding false ones 
(some, e.g. Sartweil, have so argued). But whether or not there is any further 
value to justification than as a defense against undetected error, its importance 
to modern epistemology stems directly from epistemology's fundamental preoccu­
pation with the possibility of illusion. (I argue for this point by surveying a 
range of recent epistemological literature: Haack, Lehrer, Chisholm, BonJour, 
Goldman.) In a few words, subjective-illusion cases serve as the defining άπορίαι 
of modern epistemology, raising the general puzzle: how are these cases to be 
reconciled with our initial conviction that we do indeed know a few things? The 
responses epistemologists offer make sense only if we have first come to appreci­
ate these puzzles as needed solutions.
14. If we look for a concern with a similar kind of puzzle in Aristotle, or for 
that matter in Plato, we will be disappointed: neither seems very worried about 
the possibility of undetected illusion. For that matter, neither Plato or 
Aristotle seems too concerned to explain how it is that we (that is to say, the 
mass of humanity) have knowledge: on the contrary, they both think that most of us 
just don't really know much. To mention just one famous image, the prisoners in 
the cave of Republic VII are like us; they actually know nothing of any conse­
quence, despite their illusions to the contrary, and they are no judges at all of 
the knowledge of those who do know. (Instances are multiplied in the full paper.) 
Aristotle likewise regards knowledge generally as something the philosopher 
strives for, not something most people manage to have. According to Met. A, the 
highest truths of philosophy are at first startling, confusing, unbelievable to 
the unphilosophical multitude. But Aristotle exhorts us to try to make ourselves 
into gods, viewing the world from a perspective quite remote from that of ordinary 
humanity. Thus, the refutation of Cartesian skepticism and the defense of our 
ordinary knowledge claims are not significant concerns for Aristotle and Plato.
But if they were not concerned with the underlying problems that give rise to 
modern epistemology, then they did not offer solutions to those problems. If we 
read such solutions into them, we must be missing the point.
15. Socrates, of course, said that virtually everyone he encountered had 
illusions, but those are illusions of a very specific kinds. He met politicians 
who thought they knew about important things, poets who thought they knew about 
the gods, craftsmen who thought they knew about things outside their craft. What 
he rejects in these people is their claims to more than ordinary understanding: he
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does not try to convince them that they do not know whether they are asleep or 
awake, whether they are perceiving or being deluded by Zeus. Indeed, he does not 
question the craftsmen's knowledge of their crafts, only their claims to know 
about important things (such as the welfare of the state) besides.
16. There are in fact a few places in Plato {Theaetetus 158b-d) and Aristotle 
{Met. Γ 6, 1011a3-14) which do seem to raise the possibility of massive general 
error or illusion. Now, even if these do constitute counterexamples to my general 
claim, it is still true that there is much discussion of knowledge in both 
Aristotle and Plato in which undetected illusion is simply not an issue, and thus 
my general thesis could be sustained. However, I believe it can be shown that 
even in these places, the refutation of the Cartesian skeptic has nothing to do 
with Plato's or Aristotle's concerns. But before I argue for this point, we must 
take up another which has been suspended for some time. I have argued that since 
Aristotle and Plato do not worry about the possibility of general illusion, they 
were therefore not motivated by the same problematic as modern epistemology.
What, then, was their problematic, and how do they try to resolve their own 
particular problems?
17. Part of the answer is this: both Plato and Aristotle devote considerable 
attention to the question 'how is false belief possible at all?' Plato addresses 
this in the Republic. Theaetetus. and Sophist; Aristotle in the An♦ Pr. (11.21), 
An. Post. (1.16-17), and indirectly elsewhere. They are thus more worried about 
the possibility that we cannot be mistaken than about the possibility that we are 
always liable to error. This should surprise us: it is nearly diametrically 
opposed to modern epistemology, which arises out of the worry that false belief 
might be lurking everywhere. Why is this important to them?
18. A brief look at their historical context will help. The thesis that false 
belief is impossible has a long pedigree, going back to Parmenides. It also bears 
a strong resemblance to a thesis associated with Protagoras: whatever each of us 
believes is true (for each of us). Other more prosaic versions of the same thesis 
can be located in such sources as Herodotus' occasional implication that each 
society's judgments about what conduct is right are authoritative for that 
society. What is at issue in all these cases is the question whether anyone or 
anything is in a position to judge (κρίνειν) what is true. It is only if there is 
in fact a judgment-independent truth that there can be judges.
19. Now, Plato and Aristotle both maintain that philosophy can judge what is 
true and false, and also what is right and wrong, for everyone. This is precisely 
the important dimension of Plato's argument in Republic V that philosophers should 
have political power: on the assumption that knowledge of the human good is 
possible, those who possess it should have the power to judge not only for 
themselves but for the rest of us. Many will agree with this conditional but find 
its antecedent totally implausible. Thus, it is critical for Plato to be able to 
establish that knowledge— or more correctly science— is possible about such 
things. The attention these philosophers give to the possibility of false belief 
now makes good sense. If there are false beliefs, then people make mistakes; 
therefore, there may be experts who truly know better. Thus, an epistemological 
project of the first importance for Plato and for Aristotle is establishing that 
philosophy, or science, is humanly attainable. A higher cognition than the 
ordinary, which is by rights the judge of how things really are, is a possibility 
only if a rather large amount of what most of us suppose we know is in fact not 
knowledge at all.
20. In several places, Aristotle addresses puzzles that turn on the apparent 
impossibility of having inconsistent beliefs: if S simultaneously believes p and 
does not believe p; but then it is simultaneously true and false of S that S 
believes p; thus, S simultaneously has and does not have one and the same proper­
ty, in violation of the principle of non-contradiction. Such passages include An. 
Post. 1.16-17, An. Pr. 1.21, De An. III.3, 428b2-9 (I discuss Met. Γ separately).
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This type of argument can be used attack the possibility of άκρασία (see EN VII.2). 
It can also form the basis of an argument that scientific knowledge, which must be 
universal rather than particular, cannot be learned: if I know that every F is G 
but fail to believe of a, which is an F, that it is G (because I am unaware that a 
exists, because I have failed to carry out an inference, because I have some other 
conflicting belief), then it appears that I simultaneously do and do not believe 
the same thing. This leads to the dilemma of An. Post. 1.1, 71al7-b8: either I 
cannot learn anything or I already know everything. To solve this puzzle, 
Aristotle introduces various senses of 'believe' (actual versus potential, 
universal versus particular, and a rather sophisticated distinction between 
believing all the premises of an inference separately and considering them all 
together) which allow him to say that none of these cases actually involves both 
affirming and denying the same predicate of the same subject.
21. Against this background, we can better understand what is up in Met. Γ. 
Aristotle's purpose there is not to confront the Cartesian global skeptic. In 
fact, in the one passage in which he comes closest to dealing with a Cartesian 
illusion argument (6, 1011a3-14), he dismisses the possibility that we might all 
be dreaming with remarkably little concern: he treats this as an obvious instance 
of a problem not worth pursuing, not a serious απορία. This makes sense in the 
light of his overall purpose in Γ 3-6, which is not to refute the skeptic but to 
reject the relativist's position that everyone's beliefs are as good as anyone 
else's. Aristotle's strategy in response is to argue that the principle of non­
contradiction is, in an objective way, cognitively prior to any other principle. 
This explains why he begins with what looks like a terrible argument: no one can 
disbelieve the principle of non-contradiction, for to do so would be simultaneous­
ly to believe and not believe the same thing, which would violate the principle of 
non-contradiction (1005b26-32). Although this seems to be a petitio. its purpose 
is not to establish that the PNC is true but that it is cognitively primary by 
nature (γνωριμώτατον τή φύσει). (I also include a brief discussion of the dream 
puzzle in Theaetetus 158b5-d6, arguing that this also is not concerned with the 
Cartesian skeptical possibility of undetected illusion but rather with the 
relativist objection that nobody is in a position to judge which opinions are 
correct: the dream argument simply makes this internal to one person's percep­
tions.)
22. Therefore, it is the need to respond to various forms of relativism, with 
their nihilistic consequences for philosophy and science, that was the primary 
epistemological goal for Plato and Aristotle. Such a goal is a far more credible 
and a far more urgent one for them than the refutation of Cartesian radical 
skepticism, a position they do not even seem to take seriously. Later Creek 
skeptics (at least as represented by Sextus Empiricus) appear to have had exactly 
the sort of view Plato and Aristotle wanted to reject. They maintained, not that 
every one of our everyday beliefs is subject to doubt, but that no one has the 
kind of deep understanding of the causes of things that philosophers claim to have 
(Frede, Burnyeat). Though it is unwise to read Sextus' views back into the fourth 
century, the relationship of his arguments to those used by Protagoras and other 
sophists is telling.
23. Much more would have to be done to complete an argument for my claim that 
Plato and Aristotle were simply not concerned with the defining issues of modern 
epistemology. This is especially true in the case of Plato: given that the 
Theaetetus is treated by epistemologists as something of a locus classicus for the 
justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge, what I am advancing is bound to seem 
outrageous and will require a much fuller defense. Likewise, a great deal more is 
required to respond to the enormous quantity of detailed analysis of passages on 
which Irwin's position is founded. However, I would at least claim to have raised 
a problem which further study of ancient epistemology must address.
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